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Bernard Mandeville and the Universalization of Christian Ethics: 
an Impoverishing Tradition 
Abstract 
 Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees was received with shock in eighteenth-century 
English society; this came due to its claims of vice being better than virtue for the economic 
benefit of society.  He goes so far as to claim “virtue is made friends with vice” when people 
follow the latter’s demands. Such a claim was viewed as being an attack on Christian ethics and 
the belief that society is best composed when done so with virtuous members (of a Christian 
variety) exclusively.  Some of his detractors even went so far as to label him a “Man-Devil” for 
these perceived slights.  But it is not the case that the Fable of the Bees entirely negates Christian 
virtue in its conclusions.  Rather, in The Fable of the Bees and Mandeville’s associated writings, 
he merely shows the incompatibility of Christian moral virtue at the societal level with the best 
functioning of its economy.  But if a flourishing economy is understood as the best means of 
promoting welfare an antinomy arises between two lines of Christian ethical thought: the 
combatting of vice and the helping of those most in need.  The solution to which may rest in a 
reinterpretation of the role of Christians within a society. 
Part I - Introduction 
 Bernard Mandeville, born in 1670 and died in 1733, was many things, physician-cum-
political-satirist foremost among which, but “Man-Devil” he was not.1  His Fable of the Bees or 
The Grumbling Hive, a satirical poem published initially in 1703 and aimed at the virtue 
obsessed people of his day, however, certainly seems to have earned him this reputation among 
his peers.  Richard Cook, in his book on Mandeville, notes that “no English author since Thomas 
Hobbes had touched so raw a nerve, and men who agreed in almost nothing else became united 
in their condemnation of Mandeville” (Cook 117).  John Maynard Keynes, a giant of modern 
economic history, took space in his magnum opus to comment on how The Fable of the Bees 
was, “convicted as a nuisance by the grand jury of Middlesex in 1723,” and that it, “stands out in 
the history of moral sciences for its scandalous reputation” (Keynes 359).   
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 Although the Fable of the Bees itself was a satirical poem which, upon the initial 
publishing, was hardly noticed by the public and would gain little to no ground beyond the 
artistic for its argumentation, the accompanying series of essays which were added in the 1714 
and 1723 editions helped to further establish both Mandeville’s arguments and notoriety.  The 
fable itself is designed to mirror Aesop’s fable of the frogs who wished for a king only to be 
given a crane by whom they are consumed; Mandeville depicts a thriving hive of bees that wish 
and pray away all the semblances of vice in their midst only to then starve, diminish in 
prominence and generally suffer due to that vice having been what sustained their flourishing.  
“Bare virtue can’t make nations live” cried he, instead it is preferable that “every part [be] full of 
Vice / Yet the whole mass a paradise” (Mandeville 27). 
 What further garnered such an infamous reputation was his theses on the apparent 
incompatibility between a society that wishes to promote virtue with one which holds a thriving 
economy.  This virtuosity which he combats is necessarily one defined by a Christian set of 
ideals, as it is the 18th-century English society for which he writes.  Similar to Thomas Hobbes, 
as is noted in the prior remark from Richard Cook, detractors smeared him as utterly anti-
Christian for his published views.  Mandeville weaved an account of society in such a way as to 
reveal that, as he says in the remarks, “virtue is made friends with vice when industrious good 
people, who maintain their families and bring up their children handsomely, pay taxes, and are 
several ways useful members of society, get a livelihood by something that chiefly depends on, 
or is very much influenced by the vices of others, without themselves being guilty of, or 
accessory to them” (55-56).  In fact, he goes further yet arguing that a society “without great 
Vices” is merely a “vain Eutopia” condemned to remain within one’s imagination (34).   
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 Perhaps the most striking example to the reader comes in his “Remark G,” in which he 
argues thieves to be better for society than those “misers” who save their money and uphold an 
ascetic lifestyle; once a thief has spent the money he stole from those who would otherwise save 
it, Mandeville reckons, “the nation would be better for the robbery, and would receive the same 
and as real a benefit from it, as if an archbishop had left the sum to the public” (57).  This view 
subtly anticipates the paradox of thrift later purposed by Keynesian economic theory.  It holds 
simply that money saved deprives the economy of its utilization and therefore discourages the 
growth which otherwise might have arisen from it.  Thus, the perceived ascetic virtue necessary 
to take up the act of saving, in the words of Keynes, would “necessarily defeat itself” (Keynes 
84).  A problem easily solved by Mandeville’s thief.2  
 So too is Mandeville considered a precursor to Adam Smith’s notion of the Invisible 
Hand, which allows economies to function through the self-love and pride of each actor therein.  
Mandeville argued, albeit less systematically than Smith, for a similar function of self-love in 
“Remark M” of the Fable; “pride and luxury are the great promoters of trade” he posits alongside 
the claim that “in a more virtuous age (such a one as should be free from pride) trade would in a 
great measure decay” (Mandeville 73-74).  Rather, it is solely by virtue of having that vice of 
prideful self-love that any commerce might happen at all within a society; without which, 
nobody would seek to further their wealth beyond what is necessary for their survival.  Should 
vice, then, be eliminated entirely from the society-at-large not only would a massive economic 
shock ensue as the barkeeps are forced to fight over the reduced demand for drink sans 
drunkards, lock makers become entirely obsolete, and the fashion industry vanishes into thin air, 
but so too would all industries become hurt by a universally diminished demand.  Demand that 
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was formerly defined by the wants and excess desires of people in a society would then be 
defined by the most basic necessities required for people to get by.   
Part II - Antinomy 
 The fallacy of composition, perhaps, best illustrates the point at hand here; in which, the 
connection between an attribute held by all the parts is denied being necessarily indicative of the 
whole.  William Rowe, in his essay on this fallacy, gives the example of a machine constituted 
exclusively by small parts – the machine need not be small simply because its parts are all small 
– and another example of a shape made entirely of triangular pieces – obviously, this new shape 
doesn’t need to be a triangle.  Yet counter examples exist where the connection is necessary. 
Such as something being made entirely of parts bearing a single-color, thus necessitating, aside 
from some trick of the light, the whole thing being that same color.  But since the rules apply 
only some of the time3 it must be true that the connection is not necessary between a descriptor 
of all the parts and a proposed utilization of the same descriptor in regard to the whole. 
 How this fallacy manifests itself in our concerns here is self-evident: a society composed 
of virtuous people is not necessarily virtuous.  Further yet, under the auspices of Mandeville, as 
described above, we might be made aware that specifically for a society utilizing Christian 
conceptions of virtue it is not the case that such a descriptor of the part would manifest itself unto 
the whole.  Rather, the exact opposite is true if he is to be believed.   
 An irreconcilable set of beliefs then comes to the fore with the consideration of a moral 
duty given to Christians to feed the hungry, provide drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, and 
generally provide for those who are in need of such things given in Matthew chapter 254.  For it 
has become irrefutably apparent through the history of all hitherto society that the best-proven 
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means of providing such necessities to those most in need is through promoting a thriving 
economy in which such things may be made available to the greatest numbers.  So unless welfare 
towards the poor in Christian moral doctrine might be justified as being meant to exist solely on 
a case by case basis, for which I can think of no justification why this might be the case, then the 
best means yet known of following the commands given to Christians within the above cited 
piece would be through a capitalist market.   
 The antinomy is one of the promotion of virtue and optimal promotion of welfare5 each 
being anathema towards the other, yet each being potentially endorsed through different modes 
of Christian thought.  Mandeville has shown his reader that the former, as it is understood to 
come at the expense of vice, cannot be promoted without becoming detrimental towards the 
welfare of society.  Similarly, should the latter be chosen as an objective, it can only be made 
optimal should the equally good desire of limiting vice be disposed of.   
Part III - Possible Solutions 
 Louis Dumont argued, albeit briefly, that Adam Smith reaches a similar problem of 
traditional Christian morals becoming opposed to the proper function of the market as 
understood through the concept of the invisible hand; declaring that it, “performs here a little-
noticed function. It is as if God told us, ‘Don’t be afraid, my child, of apparently trespassing 
against my commands.  I have so arranged everything that you are justified in neglecting 
morality in this particular case’” (Dumont 61-62).  But I should ponder what type of omnipotent 
God should make such a precise incision into otherwise universal laws.  Alternatively, if there 
were grounds for a Kierkegaardian teleological suspension of the ethical of some sort in these 
concerns it would render the laws of the deity comical in our modern age due to the mass 
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proliferation of economic concerns into every aspect of our lives.  Clearly, Dumont’s 
characterization of the problem cannot be taken as the fact of the matter.  
 So how should the good Christian deal with such a conflict of ideas?  In modernity, it 
seems, Christians have chosen to simply ignore the problem of vice being as such; practices, 
formerly morally ambiguous are reframed to fit within a modern context, such as usury, 
historically considered the case for any lending with interest, becoming merely those cases where 
excessive interest is charged; so too, pride and luxury only really being considered vice in 
modernity when at the levels of millionaires and movie stars.  But these redefinitions seem to be 
nothing more than relativizing one’s state in relation to what would otherwise be increased vice 
by the standards held in the rest of this document.   
 The solution must lay elsewhere.  So, I will close with a brief comment which up until 
now has gone unnoted explicitly in the body of this work, despite holding a place in the title; this 
is the problem of the universalization of Christian ethics, or rather the incapacity therein.  I 
suspect that the true merits of Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees do not lay in his making 
friends of virtue and vice, as he would suppose, but his illumination of the impossibility of a 
truly Christian society.  Perhaps, Christianity is only sensible and logically coherent within a 
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1 Mandeville’s name was satirized to which in a London publication (Hundert, E.J. 7)  
2It is worth noting two things here; the first, that Keynes did not use the term “paradox of thrift” so far as 
I can tell, this term seems to have been popularized by Paul Samuelson; second, Mandeville only endorses 
thieves in “Remark G” insofar as they are preferable to the miser.   
3 He delves deeper into the issue of the descriptor being different in meaning when viewed relative to the 
part or the whole as a potential way of explaining this, which he ultimately rejects.  Instead, he seems to 
favor what seems to be a case by case analysis of these part-whole instances of the fallacy of composition.  
4 Specifically, Matthew 25:34-46.   
5 By “welfare” I mean in the general sense of the term, not in the modern sense of it being a product of 
governments.  
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